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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 880618CA
(Category No. 2)

vs.
LANE C. STROMBERG,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING

Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals Appellant petitions this Court to rehear or amend its
decision handed down on November 8, 1989, 121 Utah Advanced
Reporter 22. The following points of law and fact are asserted
by petitioner as matters having been overlooked or misapprehended
by the prior opinion of this Court.
I.

ERRORS AND OMISSIONS OF FACTS

The Court in its opinion misconstrued and omitted several
important facts which are relevant in analyzing the legal issues
presented.
1.

These factual deficiencies are as follows.

The Court failed to note that the April 1988 interview

between Police Chief John W. Gardiner and the fifteen-year-old
girl T.H. was in the context of a criminal investigation in which
the defendant was being accused by T.H. of unlawful sexual
intercourse.

Moreover, this was the third interview conducted by
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the Police Chief in the preceding months and was the first time
in which any mention of drugs was made.

(Tr. Motion to

Suppress, p. 77). In addition, at the Motion to Suppress hearing
Mr. Mark Andrus of the Davis County Attorney's office testified
that if nothing else any drugs which were discovered during the
search would be used as leverage in the unlawful sexual
intercourse case.
2.

(Tr. Motion to Suppress, p. 184).

The Court failed to note in its opinion that one of the

interviews conducted by Chief Gardiner with the fifteen-year-old
affiant occurred at the McKay-Dee Behavioral Institute where the
girl was being treated for emotional problems.

Chief Gardiner

testified that he had talked with two psychiatrists at the
hospital concerning her emotional stability.

(Tr. Motion to

Suppress, p. 54).
3.

The opinion also failed to note that charges were in

fact filed against the defendant for unlawful sexual intercourse
with the fifteen-year old minor and a trial was held on that
accusation.

Defendant was acquitted of the charge presumably

because of the testimony of the fifteen-year-old accuser which
the jury found to be unreliable.
4.

The Court stated in its opinion that Chief Gardiner

"learned that the girl had no juvenile court record." In fact,
however, Chief Gardiner testified that he only asked the girl as
to her record and did not make any other inquiry from any source
as to whether she had a record or not.

(Tr. Motion to Suppress,

pp. 56-57).
5.

The Court also failed to note the testimony explaining

the reason for the delay between the April 25 statement upon
which the affidavit was based and the May 20 request for a search
warrant.

Police Chief Gardiner was asked the following question:

Q.

But your concern was that you didnft believe
the possession of marijuana was sufficient
to get a search warrant in April to go out
and search the home for that specific item.

A.

That's correct.

(Tr. Motion to Suppress, p. 30).

In fact, the house was placed under surveillance by the police
department and it was not until alleged drug dealers were seen
parked in front of the home that it was decided to conduct the
search.

The following dialogue indicates the true reason that

the search was executed a month later:
Q.

But apparently Lon Brian indicated that this
known user or dealer in drugs had been seen
coming and going from Mr. Strombergfs home during
his surveillance?

A.

Yes, he related that to us at that time.

Q.

Which would be the 19th or 20th?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And that would be substantial that drugs had been
brought into the home?

A.

The possibility of that, yes sir.

Q.

So obviously you met with Brian and director of
the traffic force, Mr. Holthous, and said let's
get the warrant today and investigate?

A.

We contacted the county attorney's office.

Q.

To get the warrant?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

So the decision was made to search the home on
May 20 to search the home?

A.

Yes, sir.

-3-

Q,

Not specifically marijuana pipes, you weren't
materially concerned about that, were you?

A.

Well I was concerned about that because that's
what was in the house too.

Q.

Well any paraphernalia?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

But the main concern that you had was that this
recent activity was thought to believe that drugs
had been brought into the home?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And perhaps substantial drugs had been brought
into the home?

A.

Perhaps.

6.

(Tr. Motion to Suppress, pp. 45-46).

The opinion states "Defendant testified at trial and

admitted possessing marijuana, but denied any knowledge of the
cocaine found in his garage."
error.

This statement is also clearly in

Mr. Stromberg*s girlfriend, Helen, testified that

regarding a minute quantity of marijuana found in the bedroom
that she had brought it into the home a considerable time prior
to the search.

Mr. Stromberg indicated that he remembered her

bringing it into the home but had long forgotten about it and was
unaware of its presence.

The main quantity of marijuana found in

the home was in the kitchen.

In his testimony Mr. Stromberg

denied that it was his, denied it belonged to him, and denied
that he had ever seen it before.

He simply testified that he

owned the jars that held the marijuana.
II.

MISAPPREHENSION OF LAW CONCERNING PROBABLE CAUSE

The omission of the critical facts concerning the manner in
which the interview with the fifteen-year-old affiant was
obtained casts a considerably different light upon her
-4-

reliability than that stated in the Court's opinion.

The opinion

states that the girl "in this case is more akin to the 'average
neighbor witness' described in State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363,
1366 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), than to a confidential informant,"
This statement is clearly incorrect when viewed in light of the
corrected and omitted facts-

The girl in this case had accused

Defendant of a felony and was being interviewed by the detective
based upon those accusations.

An accuser of a crime is hardly a

"average neighbor witness."
In addition, the girl was being treated in a psychiatric
hospital for emotional disturbances at the time these statements
concerning the defendant's use of marijuana were obtained.

No

effort was made by the police chief to verify her reliability as
to truth telling even though her presence in this hospital
certainly would give rise to a reasonable suspicision that there
may be problems with reality.
These facts together with the admission by the county
attorney that the effort to discover drugs in the home was for
the purpose of inducing a plea to the sexual intercourse charge
casts a reasonable doubt upon the objectivity of this witness and
should require an evaluation of her veracity, reliability and
basis of knowledge under the totality-of-the-circumstances test.
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987); Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).

Thus, the statement by this

Court that veracity is assumed in this case because of the girl's
status as an "average neighbor witness" is incorrect and has made
an improper analysis of what was required at the time the
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affidavit was examined by the magistrate.

Without such

information being presented as to the reliability and veracity of
the affiant "a court cannot determine whether the information was
obtained in the context of unreliable circumstances such as
casual rumor." State v. Droneburg, 120 Utah Adv. Rptr. 27,
29 (UtahApp., Oct. 20, 1989).
Defendant also sought to suppress the warrant on the basis
that it was pretextual in that the police were seeking evidence
of illegal activity other than the mere possession and use of
marijuana.

This Court focused solely upon the broad language

contained in the warrant and rejected this argument of Defendant.
121 Utah Adv. Rptr. at p. 24.
The defendant, however, argued that this pretext search was
also evidenced by the facts of the case as well as by the
language of the warrant.

As noted earlier, the police chief

admitted that he did not feel he had sufficient reason to seek a
search warrant merely based upon the girl's statements.

Instead,

he staked out the house and after learning that a purported drug
dealer was seen at the residence decided at that point to seek a
warrant.

Again, from the transcript of the suppression hearing

it is obvious that the police chief was seeking a much larger
prize than consumptive marijuana.
Thus, while the police chief essentially requested the
warrant because of the observation of the alleged drug dealer's
presence, he did not make this fact part of the affidavit to the
magistrate.

Presumably, because he knew that the mere presence

of a reported drug dealer was not in and of itself sufficient to
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For these reasons, therefore, Defendant respectfully
requests that the issue concerning the legality of the search
warrant be re-examined with a full hearing or, in the
alternative, that the opinion be amended to include the erroneous
and omitted material and that a new legal analysis be made.
III.

MISAPPREHENSION CONCERNING THE
CLAIM OF PENALTY ENHANCEMENT

This Court relies heavily upon the recent Supreme Court
decision of State v. Moore, 120 Utah Adv. Rptr. 10 (Utah, Oct. 5,
1989) . Defendant concurs that the decision in State v. Moore was
correct based upon the circumstances.

In that case the defendant

was charged with selling narcotics to a confidential informant at
his home which was located within 1,000 feet of a school in Moab,
Utah.

There seems to be no question but that a person selling

and dealing drugs within the 1,000-foot area fits within the
rational purpose of legislation to protect children from such
influences.

The Supreme Court stated, "In the instant case,

under the police power, the state legislature has taken measures
to protect the public health, safety, and welfare of children of
Utah from the presumed extreme potential danger created when drug
transactions occur on or near a school ground." Id. at 13. The
court also stated, "The presumed potential risk that children
could become customers or suppliers is a sufficient ground alone
to rationally support the legislation." Id.
The reasoning which is applicable to the Moore case is not
applicable to the instant case.

During the trial and at all
-8-
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location of a residence to a school or playground.

This is

further evidenced by the fact as explained in the Moore case that
the lack of knowledge about the proximity of a school is not a
defense under the statute.

120 Utah Adv. Rptr. pp. 14-15.

In

Moore the Supreme Court justified the lack of this defense on
the basis that:
A reasonable person would know that drug
trafficking is subject to stringent public regulation
because it can seriously threaten the community's health
and safety, particularly as it relates to the
community's heightened concern for the health, safety
and welfare of its children. And because knowledge of
[the statute] is presumed in law, it is reasonable for
Congress to have expected drug traffickers to ascertain
their proximity to schools and remove their operation
from these areas or assume the risk for their failure to
do so. Id. at 14 quoting United States v.
Holland, 810 F.2d 1215, 1223-24 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
This same presumption cannot be said to apply to individuals
who use marijuana for personal use.

There is no logical

connection between their use in the privacy of their home and the
location of their home to a school or playground.

The majority

of these types of individuals would not be aware of any thousandfoot limitation from a school yard since such activity does not
put them on notice of the same type of risk as a drug trafficker.
Thus, while the enhancement statute can be justified in
terms of commercial dealing of drugs for the protection of
children it cannot be justified from mere possession in a private
residence.

For this reason a rehearing should be granted as to

this issue also.
CONCLUSION
The failure to include essential facts, the misstatement of
several facts, and the misanalysis of the probable cause issue
-1 n-

and the enhancement

issue requires a re-examination of this case

with the opportun

-id-inf' In I nILy develop the arguments

p res en ted herein.
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